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SECTION 301: ACCESS TO FOREIGN MARKETS
FROM AN AGRICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE*
by Marsha A. Echols**
INTRODUCTION
With the recent enactment of Title IX of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 [hereinafter "section 301"],' it is timely to consider how section 301, as
amended thereby, can be implemented to resolve certain international trade
problems currently faced by U.S. exporters of agricultural products. This
article attempts to answer that question by briefly discussing the major trade
barriers faced by exporters of agricultural products and the legislative
history of section 301 to determine how that statute can be used to protect
certain interests of U.S. exporters of farm products.
The Carter Administration said the United States will take the lead in
implementing recently concluded Tokyo Round "codes": international guide-
lines governing the use of certain nontariff barriers to the free flow of
international trade.2 For agriculture, the use of the codes to obtain market
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily
the views of the United States Department of Agriculture or the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission.
** Counsel to the Vice-Chairman of the International Trade Commission.
1. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1979), 45 Fed. Reg. 34870 (May 23, 1980). This title amends
Title III of the Trade Act of 1974.
2. The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations was noteworthy for the
attempts of the participants to define the disciplines on the use of some of the more
flagrant nontariff barriers to trade. The resulting codes, as they are called, have been
accepted by most of the developed countries but by few developing countries. Those
codes accepted by the President and approved by the Congress are set forth at 19
U.S.C. § 2503(c). From an agricultural perspective, the most important of those codes
are the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing
measures) [hereinafter the "Subsidies Code"] and the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade (relating to product standards) [hereinafter the "Standards Code"]. Another
code of interest to the agricultural exporting community is the Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures [hereinafter the "Licensing Code"]. The participants in the Tokyo
Round also concluded bilateral and multilateral trade agreements specifically applic-
able to trade in agricultural products, as set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 2503 and Title VII of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. The codes are reproduced in the Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting the Texts of the Trade Agreements
Negotiated in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Pursuant to
Section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, H.R. DOC. NO. 96-153, Pt. I, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1979) [hereinafter "TOKYO ROUND TEXTS"].
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access is a key issue. Given seemingly ideal conditions, such as continued
world population growth, price and quality competitiveness, export promo-
tion and favorable weather conditions, U.S. farm products should be able to
enter foreign markets and be competitive. However, conditions are not ideal,
because, among other factors, many countries impose unfair impediments to
U.S. exports and unfairly compete in third country markets. With the U.S.
government's encouragement of a vigorous implementation of the Tokyo
Round codes, agricultural producers should face improved trading conditions
in international markets. The elaboration through inter-national precedent
of the new discipline on the use of export subsidies and of limitations on the
use of product standards and import licensing procedures as artificial
barriers to trade are concerns of U.S. exporters of agricultural products which
should be addressed without delay. The international precedent may be
established under the procedures of section 301.
By focusing attention on the unfair practices of other countries, the
United States will certainly attract criticism of certain of its policies.
3
Nevertheless, if the net result of the effort is a reduction in nontariff barriers
worldwide, a clarification of the rules governing international trade in
agricultural products and a more widespread adherence to those rules, the
system of international trade will be enhanced.
CHANGING NATURE OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE BARRIERS
Many agricultural economists view the period from the late 1890s to the
beginning of World War I as a time of prosperity for U.S. agriculture. There
was a balance between worldwide consumption and domestic production.
International interdependence grew.
World War I led to a greatly expanded production of cereals, meats and
meat products to meet foreign demand. The resulting overproduction,
3. Among the American laws most often cited as trade restrictive are section 22
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (7 U.S.C. § 624) (relating to quantitative
restrictions and duties), the meat import law (7 U.S.C. § 1202) (relating to quantitative
restrictions) and section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 (7 U.S.C. § 1854) (relating
to bilateral export restraint agreements). Tariffs, not quantitative restrictions on
quotas, are the preferred method of restricting imports under international trade law.
During the Tokyo Round discussions concerning a possible safeguard or escape clause
code, the compatability of each of the above laws with the substantive and procedural
requirements of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinaf-
ter "GATT"] was questioned. (Only 7 U.S.C. § 624 has been granted a formal waiver of
the requirements of the GAIT at 3 BISD 32 (1955)). The United States has refused to
negotiate these and many other laws, unless other countries will dismantle their pro-
tectionist legislation. However, neither side can withstand the domestic political
opposition to such a negotiation. For Congress's position on the inviolability of section
22, see 7 U.S.C. § 624(f).
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combined with a weakening international economy, led to price fluctuations.
Counties imposed barriers to imports in an attempt to make domestic
agricultural policies effective,4 to maintain or gain a competitive position in
domestic and foreign markets and to reduce the foreign exchange flow caused
by imports. Initially those barriers were fairly straightforward measures
taken to impede market access: tariffs and other charges on imports.
Gradually the import barriers became complex, obscure, numerous and
nontariff in form. Nontariff barriers to the free flow of international trade
replaced tariffs and charges as the primary means of restraining free
international trade and denying market access. Currently, domestic agri-
cultural policies and export promotion efforts are used, directly or indirectly,
to obtain and maintain a competitive position in export markets. Conse-
quently, nontariff barriers now impede market access and restrict competi-
tive opportunities in third country markets.
There is agreement among governments that certain practices, when
they have sdverse effects on trade, constitute nontariff barriers to interna-
tional trade.' There is disagreement about other practices, which on their
4. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 12-14 (1970) [hereinafter "FEDERAL
RESERVE"]. The concept of a "parity price," or the ideal price to be achieved by far-
mers, is measured by reference to the prices for a particular agricultural product in the
World War I period, i.e., 1910-1914. That period is considered more satisfactory than
others in terms of price relationships. Hence many farmers today seek government
payments to achieve "parity", i.e., a price which achieves a constant real price relative
to the pre-World War I period. See D. GALE JOHNSON, WORLD AGRICULTURE IN
DISARRAY 30-31 (1973) [hereinafter "JOHNSON"].
5."Protection for domestic agriculture received some support as part of a program
of economic preparedness against possible future loss of foreign supplies, as well
as part of a search for an internal political balance in which a stable peasantry
would help offset the growing strength of newly emerging radical parties. Furth-
ermore, agricultural products were tending to fall on world markets as lower cost
producing areas outside Europe maintained the high levels of production induced
by the war, in spite of lower European demand for agricultural imports. Because
of these factors, agricultural protectionism in Europe became increasingly evident
after 1925. Government intervention affecting foreign trade in farm commodities
was often the initial form taken by Government programs seeking to relieve the
difficulties under which their agricultural sectors were suffering." FEDERAL RE-
SERVE, supra note 4, at 17. See also JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 28-43 and
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, 93rd CONG. 1st Sess.,
AGRICULTURALTRADE AND THE PROPOSED ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS 2-6 (Comm. Print 1973).
6. See the preambles to the Subsidies Code and Standards Code for expressions of
governments' current emphasis on the effects, rather than the existence, of a nontariff
barrier. See also Articles 8, 10-11 of the Subsidies Code and Article 2.1 of the Stan-
dards Code.
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face are domestic policies but which, in reality, can have a distorting effect on
the volume of goods available for export or for sale on the domestic market.
David Gale Johnson, the renowned economist, wrote of the impediments
to the free flow of international trade caused by the protection of domestic
agriculture:
The interference, however, includes measures other than tariffs, quotas
or export subsidies. A reduction in imports is no less real or significant
if it occurs as a result of a production expansion engendered by
deficiency payments rather than from a tariff or quota. Similarly,
exports can be encouraged by input subsidies or deficiency payments
related to output as well as by the direct use of export subsidies. Thus
protection is here defined to include techniques that may be used to
increase domestic production above the level that would prevail if
farmers received the world market prices and nothing more.'
Perhaps without great exaggeration, it has been said that: "After World War
H the agricultural problems grew slowly larger. Gradually it might be said
that from the 1950s [agrigultural problems] came to be recognized as the
nastiest and most intractable problems confronting the world trading
community."8
After World War II, the negotiators of the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade' [hereinafter the "GATT"I made little progress in
establishing international rules to govern the use of nontariff barriers to the
flow of agricultural trade. One reason was that the applicability of the GAIT
to agriculture was, and is, a topic of much discussion. Governments have
been reluctant or unwilling to apply to agricultural trade the basic rules of
the GATT to the extent they are applied to industrial trade. Thus there are
few references in the GATT to agriculture, 0 and the GATT itself did not
7. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 227.
8. GERARD AND VICTORIA CURZON, HIDDEN BARRIERS TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 1 (1970) [hereinafter "CURZON"]. Gerard Curzon is Professor of In-
ternational Economics at the Graduate Institute of International Studies at the Uni-
versity of Geneva. Victoria Curzon is chargO de cours at the Institut Universitaire d
Etudes Europednes and a research associate at the University of Geneva.
9. October 30, 1947. T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). There are, in fact,
two references: Article XI (relating to quantitative restrictions) and Article XVI:3 (re-
lating to export subsidies).
10. Article XVI:3 admonishes the governments which formally apply the GATT,
officially referred to as the contracting parties, to "seek to avoid" the use of export
subsidies. There is no prohibition on their use. Cf. Article XVI:4 (relating to subsidies
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effectively restrain the use of nontariff barriers to international trade in
agricultural products.
By 1962, the GATT was the centerpiece of international trade law. The
Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations was about to begin, with
hopes for concluding agreements further liberalizing trade in agricultural, as
well as industrial, products." However, also in 1962, the member states of the
European Economic Community [hereinafter "EEC" or the "Community"]12
enacted a systematic agricultural policy. The policy encouraged domestic
production through the use of price supports; facilitated low-priced, subsi-
dized exports through the use of export subsidies; and, restricted access to the
internal Community market through the use of import levies.
Because a significant portion of U.S. commercial exports of agricultural
products were exported to the EEC, many U.S. farmers were deeply
concerned by the common agricultural policy [hereinafter the "CAP"]. As the
first common policy of the EEC, the CAP was seen as evidence of European
unity; therefore, the United States did not argue that the CAP was
unjustifiable or inconsistent with the GATT. Instead it agreed that the
common agricultural policy should be treated as the "unbinding of
concessions" 3 permitted upon the formation of a customs union under Article
on the export of non-primary products). If a contracting party "grants directly or in-
directly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any [agricultural]
product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results
in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in
that product, account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade
in the product during a previous representative period, and any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product." (Emphasis added.)
The vagueness of the rule and its reference to a share of "world" export trade made it
virtually useless against subsidized competition in general but, particularly, against
subsidized competition in an individual third country market.
11. For a summary of the results of the Kennedy Round agricultural negotiations,
see FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL-
TURE, REPORT ON THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE
KENNEDY ROUND (1967). The results, largely tariff reductions, did not match the
hopes expressed in the United States. See also JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 25-26.
12. The European Economic Community had six member states in 1962: France,
West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The United King-
dom, Denmark, Greece and Ireland have since become member states.
13. "The central obligation of GATT is the tariff "concession," which is a commit-
ment by a GATT contracting party to levy no more than a stated tariff on a particular
item. This commitment is contained in a "Schedule" for that party. The items in the
Schedule are termed "bound" items and the individual commitment is sometimes
termed a "binding." J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 201
(1969). The decision to renege on the commitment may be referred to as an "un-
binding."
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XXIV" of the GATT. Controversy still exists regarding the wisdom of the
original U.S. position.
The CAP was implemented under Articles 9, 38-47 and 110 of the Treaty
of Rome. 5 It is a harmonized or common policy to permit free intra-
Community trade in certain agricultural products and to establish a common
pricing policy. The common agricultural policy has two major aspects: a
market policy (consisting of provisions for the free internal movement of
agricultural products and price supports) and a structural policy (relating to
the size and number of farms and related businesses). It is the market policy
which is usually called into question by U.S. exporters of agricultural
products. The CAP, through its use of price supports and market prices set at
the same level, maintains artificially high market prices for the products of
EEC farmers. The high support prices encourage production, which often
exceeds internal EEC consumption. The Community products remain salable
on the Community markets because competing imports are charged a
variable import levy, which raises the EEC price for the import to the level of
the competing EEC product. Thus, low world prices for agricultural products
have no adverse repercussions on EEC production and prices; market access
is restricted because imports are no longer price competitive. Surplus EEC
products, which were produced at above-world prices, are made price
competitive on world markets through the use of export subsidies called
export restitution payments. Thus the CAP has an effect on U.S. products
entering the EEC market and on U.S. exports competing with EEC products
for sales in third country markets.
The Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations did not address
the CAP or a multitude of other nontariff barriers. In 1970, the Curzons
wrote:
Export subsidies for agriculture are much in vogue. The purpose of those
subsidies is not to improve the balance of payments, but to foster a weak
sector for which the domestic market is too small for survival. In the
case of agriculture, high support prices lead to over-production and
hence the need to subsidize the export of the surplus. . .An essentially
domestic problem has repercussions because the way in which it is
handled threatens the trading interest of other countries.',
14. Art. XXIV has been amended by the Special Protocol relating to Article XXIV
of the GATT, signed at Havana, on March 24, 1948. See 62 U.N.T.S. 56 [19501.
15. March 25, 1957. 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
16. CURZON, supra note 8, at 8.
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By 1974, when the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations
began, the rules of the GATT were observed almost as much in the breach as
in the observance. The growing number of nontariff barriers of developed
and, increasingly, developing countries and their instrumentalities were of
increasing concern. The participants in those negotiations hesitantly began
to address some of the obvious nontariff barriers to trade in agricultural and
industrial products. However, no participating developed country was willing
to discuss an international discipline on or scrutiny of the effects of its
domestic agricultural programs and policies. Thus the proposed Multilateral
Agricultural Framework, 7 or "Cathedral," was reduced to a framework for
discussions.
Former Ambassador Robert Strauss, during testimony on the bill to
implement the Tokyo Round Agreements, illustrated the impasse:
We have gotten some major concessions in these negotiations. This
country had spent 2V2 years with no progress. One of the reasons was
that we sat over there [in Geneva] saying, "We want you to give up the
common agricultural policy." The Europeans said, "We will not give up
the common agricultural policy." It was baying at the moon. I talked to
the farm leaders in this country, for example, and our other leaders.
They agreed this was not doing them any good, so I went back to the
Europeans and said, "As much as we want you to, we know you are not
going to tear up your common agricultural policy, so let's get into
negotiation. With that understood, relax. We do not want to take that
away from you, but we want you to liberalize it a little bit. Let us get
our nose out of the tent a little further." We could have looked nice and
strong and screamed at them for two more years and moved nothing
additional into Europe. We took a policy of getting something. That is
the reason all of these agricultural groups are behind us. Instead of
pedantic postures, we pragmatically traded and improved our market
access. My judgment is the Europeans do not like the common
agricultural policy themselves; they know it is costly and wasteful. But
they cannot politically do anything about that and do not intend to at
the moment. So we might as well resolve ourselves to that and try to
live with it and liberalize it as much as we can until they get rid of it
themselves in their own due time."8
17. The Cathedral, which developed into a short framework of an agreement, was
not submitted to the Congress for its approval with the other Tokyo Round trade agree-
ments.
18. A bill to approve and implement the Trade Agreements negotiated under the
Trade Act of 1974, and for other purposes, Pt. 1. Hearings on S. 1376 before the Sub-
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Several codes and other agreements applicable to agricultural trade were
concluded during the Tokyo Round. However, the effect of the negotiations on
the liberalization of the international trade in agricultural products will be
judged largely by the implementation of the Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT [hereinafter the
"Subsidies Code"] and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
[hereinafter the "Standards Code"].
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 301
Recently, in 1962, 1974 and 1979, the Congress authorized the President
to retaliate at his discretion when the access of U.S. commerce to foreign
markets is adversely affected by certain trade practices of other countries and
instrumentalities. The authority could be used when a trade dispute could
not be resolved by consultation and negotiation.
(a) Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
To authorize the President to participate for the United States in the
Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Congress enacted the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962.11 Section 252 of that Act' [hereinafter "section
252"] authorized the President to respond to certain foreign practices which
restricted U.S. trade or hindered access to foreign markets. The checklist of
questionable practices was broadly worded and included unjustifiable foreign
import restrictions, nontariff trade restrictions, discriminatory acts, policies
unjustifiably restrictive of U.S. commerce and unreasonable import restric-
tions. The Act contained no definitions of those terms. In general, the adverse
effect of those practices on U.S. commerce was measured by determining
whether the value of a tariff commitment made to the United States had
been impaired, trade expansion prevented, or a substantial burden placed on
U.S. commerce in contravention of the terms of a trade agreement. The
presidential responses authorized by section 252 varied with the nature of
the foreign trade practice. The possible responses were designed to equalize
committee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
418 (1979) (Testimony of Ambassador Robert Strauss). For a summary of the results of
the Tokyo Round with regard to agriculture, see MTN STUDIES: 1 (results for U.S.
agriculture), 2 (Tokyo-Geneva Round: Its Relation to U.S. Agriculture), 6:4 (Analysis of
Nontariff Agreements) and 6:5 (Industry/Agriculture Sector Analysis) AGREEMENTS
BEING NEGOTIATED AT THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN
GENEVA-U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION NO.
332-101, A Report Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Finance, 96th Cong.
1st Sess., August 1979.
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the trade distortion created by the foreign practice. They included taking "all
appropriate and feasible steps within his power to eliminate such
restriction" 1 ; imposing duties or other import restrictions on the offending
country's or instrumentality's imports into the United States'; suspending,
withdrawing or preventing the application of benefits of trade agreement
concessions to products of the country or instrumentality'; and refraining
from proclaiming the benefits of trade agreement concessions, among other
remedies. 2' The response, or retaliatory measure, could be aimed at an
individual offending country, a contravention of the GATT's principle of
most-favored-nation treatment.
Since the Community recently had instituted its common agricultural
policy, the concerns of the Congress and agricultural producers focused on the
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (repealed in part 1974 and 1979). The Trade Expansion Act of
1962 authorized the President to enter into bilateral and multilateral trade agree-
ments and, as he determined required or appropriate, to implement those agreements,
to proclaim certain tariff modifications, to continue existing duties or duty-free treat-
ment and to impose certain import restrictions. The Act also provided for advice from
the Tariff Commission (now the United States International Trade Commission) and
some Executive Branch agencies (the agencies participating in the trade policy
mechanism were Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State and Treasury)
concerning proposed trade agreements and import restrictions, most-favored-nation
clauses which eliminated certain import restrictions, and for assistance to firms or
workers injured by competition from imports.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1882 (repealed 1974).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(a)(1).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(a)(3).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(b)(2)(a).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(c)(2). Cf. Arts. XXIII:2 (relating to nullification or impair-
ment) and XXVII:4(d) (relating to modification of schedules) of the GATT. Article
XXIII contains the international procedure for settling disputes which arise under the
GATT. Disputes arise when a contracting party considers that a benefit accruing to it
under the GATT is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of an objective of
the GAIT is being impeded as the result of either (1) "the failure of another contract-
ing party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement," (2) "the application by
another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provi-
sions of this agreement," or (3) "the existence of any other situation." When a dispute
remains unresolved after the completion of the dispute resolution process, the contract-
ing parties, acting jointly, may authorize a member government to suspend the ap-
plication of "such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they deter-
mine to be appropriate under the circumstances." Many issues are the subject of con-
sultations under Article XXII before becoming the subject of an Article XXIII proceed-
ing. Under Article XXVI contracting parties negotiate the modification or withdraw-
al of a concession. When no settlement can be reached on the terms for the withdrawal
or the modification by the government wishing to do so, the withdrawal or modification
may occur. However, certain affected governments may modify or withdraw substan-
tially equivalent concessions.
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CAP as a systematic tariff and nontariff barrier to trade in agricultural
products. Congressional intent to counteract the effects of these tariff and
nontariff barriers to trade is clear from the legislative history of section 252.2
It is interesting to note that what is probably the most publicized use by
the President of section 252 authority concerned exports of agricultural
products to the EEC, the so-called "chicken war."26 United States exporters of
certain poultry products to the Federal Republic of Germany complained
that, by instituting a CAP on poultry, the EEC formulated a common
external tariff higher than the previous bond concession of a member state.
The result, according to the exporters, was a more restrictive treatment of
poultry imports into Germany and the loss of $46 million in trade. An
informal advisory panel was formed by the Secretary-General of the GATT to
consider the dispute under Article XXVIII of the GATT. The panel
recommended the equivalent of $26 million in compensation for the
"unbindings of bound concessions." In response to the panel's findings, the
President temporarily increased the duties on potato starch, brandy, dextrine
and trucks. Although the duty increases were applied to imports from all
countries, as required by the GATT's most-favored-nation principle, the EEC
supplied most of the imports of the named products. The duty increases
remained in place until the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
More importantly, the Community never rescinded the CAP on poultry
products.'
(b) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Several years later, to authorize the President to participate for the
United States in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the
Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1974.1 Section 301 of that Act29 authorized
the President to respond to certain trade practices of foreign governments,
25. See [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3126-27.
26. For a discussion of the chicken or poultry war, see R. B. TALBOT, THE
CHICKEN WAR (1978).
27. See id. For a discussion of the CAP, see JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 38-39;
OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
(1974); JOHN MARSH AND CHRISTOPHER RITSON, AGRICULTURAL POLICY
AND THE COMMON MARKET (1971); MTN STUDIES: 1 (RESULTS FOR U.S.
AGRICULTURE), a Report Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Finance, 96th
CONG. 1st Sess., Aug. 1979 at CRS 227-234.
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (repealed and amended in part, 1979). The Trade Act of 1974
authorized the President, inter alia, to enter into bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements for the purpose of establishing fairness and equity in international trading
relations, including (a) the reform of the rules governing international trade, (b) the
harmonization, reduction, and elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to, and other
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when the practice had a described, adverse economic effect on U.S. commerce.
The new authority reflected the increase in Congress's concern with nontariff
barriers to international trade.30 Section 301, as originally enacted, autho-
rized the President to respond unilaterally to unreasonable' and
unjustifiable32 tariff or other import restrictions; discriminatory or other acts
or policies which were unjustifiable or unreasonable and burdened or
restricted U.S. commerce3; export subsidies which affected U.S. commerce;
and, restrictions on access to food, raw materials and other basic products.
The possible responses included the suspension, withdrawal, nonapplication
of or refusal to proclaim the benefits of trade agreement concessions and the
imposition of duties, fees and other import restrictions.
A much publicized section 301 proceeding involved the Community's
CAP on wheat. The petition was filed under the 1974 Act and became a
transition case under the 1979 amendments.' Great Plains Wheat, Inc.
distortions of, international trade and (c) securing for the commerce of the United
States, on a basis of reciprocity. equal competitive opportunities in foreign markets. S.
REP. NO. 93-1298, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter "S. REP. 93-1298"]. The
Act also authorized the President to modify tariffs, grant preferential tariff treatment
to imports from developing countries, and enter into international agreements concern-
ing supply access; provided for Congressional oversight of trade negotiations and their
implementation and for private sector advisory participation in the negotiating pro-
cess; and, established "improved procedures for responding to unfair trade practices in
the United States and abroad." Id. at 4.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (amended 1979).
30. "Section 301 revises and expands existing section 252 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 regarding responses to unjustified or unreasonable import restrictions of
other countries or instrumentalities including variable levies, export subsidies by them
to third markets which displace competitive U.S. exports, and export subsidies to the
U.S. market which substantially reduce sales of competitive domestice products." "H.R.
REP. NO. 93-571, 93d CONG. 1st Sess. (1974), at 64.
31. A restriction which is not necessarily illegal but which nullifies or impairs
benefits to the United States under trade agreements or which otherwise discriminates
against or burdens United States commerce. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, supra note 28, at
163.
32. A restriction which is illegal under international law or inconsistent with in-
ternational obligations. Id.
33. The report of the Committee on Finance described several foreign practices as
'Toreign discrimination against U.S. commerce," including discriminatory rules of ori-
gin, government procurement, licensing systems, quotas, exchange controls, restrictive
business practices, discriminatory bilateral agreements, variable levies, border tax
adjustments, discriminatory road taxes and horsepower taxes. The Committee made
particular reference to the distorting effects of subsidies and the discriminatory effects
of standards. Id. at 163-164.
34. For a discussion on the Great Plains Wheat, Inc. petition, see PATTERSON,
KEEPING THEM HAPPY DOWN ON THE FARM, 36 FOREIGN POLICY 63 (Fall
1979).
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[hereinafter "GPW"], a nonprofit market development organization, filed a
petition alleging that the EEC's restitutions on wheat shipped to Brazil
Idwered the high (domestic) price of EEC wheat to make it attractive in sales
competition in Brazil with the lower priced U.S. wheat exports. GPW's
petition alleged that subsidized Community exports of wheat displaced sales
by U.S. exporters in a third country market, Brazil, and depressed market
prices. 5 It asked that the U.S. government immediately implement counter-
active measures in retaliation for the trade disruption suffered by U.S.
farmers. 6 The measures suggested by GPW were duties on EEC imports into
the United States, an export subsidy on U.S. exports of wheat or a complaint
under Article XVI:3 of the GATT.37 The petition was pending during the
delicate, closing phases of the Tokyo Round as the United States and EEC
tried to agree upon language to define the discipline on the use of export
subsidies on agricultural products. Both the U.S. government and the
Community wanted to prevent the section 301 complaint from becoming an
explosive issue while the negotiations continued. Consequently, the only step
taken concerning the petition was to conduct bilateral discussions. The
petition, which raised basic issues concerning the permissible limits of
subsidized competition in third country markets, was considered under the
transition rule of section 301 and terminated.
Just as the CAP was a targeted trade barrier at the beginning of the
Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, the Japanese
systems of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade were targeted for negotiation
during the Tokyo Round. Japan, another potentially major market for
increased U.S. exports of agricultural products, maintains various policies
such as quotas, licensing requirements and product standards, which operate
to restrict the access of imports to the Japanese market. That country, like
many others, supports the price of certain basic crops, but at an extremely
high level. The high prices are intended to maintain or increase the level of
domestic production. In addition, Japan makes incentive payments and
payments to encourage double cropping of land. As an example of the
protection offered, the Japanese livestock industry is insulated from the
effect of imports through the use of support measures, domestic prices above
the market level, nontariff barriers to imports and a significant tariff.
Section 252 and the original section 301 were considered by U.S.
exporters of agricultural products to be means either to obtain the market
access and competitive opportunities which are associated with liberal
international trade or to retaliate against unfair trade restrictions. In fact,
35. Id. at 65.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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section 301 was originally drafted by agricultural interests concerned by the
common agricultural policy of the Community. However, neither section, as
implemented, resulted in a satisfactory resolution of the majority of the trade
problems raised under them. Perhaps the foremost reason for the resulting
dissatisfaction was the failure of successive administrations to act under the
provisions. The Executive Branch was aware that the unilateral response by
the President was considered by most countries to be illegal under
international trade law, since the response did not emanate from a
proceeding under Article XXIII or XXVIII of the GAT. Such a proceeding
could thus have an adverse effect on foreign relations. Moreover, the
country or countries against which the President acted might retaliate
against U.S. exports. Consequently, successive presidents were reluctant to
use their authority and permitted cases to drag on.
Several petitions were filed under section 301 concerning agricultural
products. Many are still pending. Six of the thirteen section 301 transition
cases involved agricultural products. Practices complained of included the
preferential duties of citrus fruits and other products the EEC imports from
Mediterranean countries; the EEC variable import levy on the sugar
additives in canned fruits; the EEC export subsidy on wheat flour; the EEC
export subsidy on barley malt; various EEC levies on imports of egg albumen
and the EEC's export subsidy on wheat shipped to Brazil.
(c) Section 301 as amended in 1979
The 1979 amendments to section 301 adopt several procedures designed
to encourage the use of the Presidential authority. First, section 301 now
imposes time limits on the determinations of the United States Trade
Representative [hereinafter "USTR"]I and the President.' Second, the
domestic proceeding will develop contemporaneously with the dispute
resolution procedure applicable under a trade agreement."0 Third, the
President's retaliatory measure may be the same as that authorized under an
internationally approved dispute resolution procedure.4'
38. Section 141 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2171) established the Office
of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations within the Executive Office of the
President to conduct trade negotiations and to advise the President on matters related
to the trade agreements program, among other duties. That Office has been renamed
the Office of the United States Trade Representative and its authority expanded to
include trade, investment and energy negotiations and policy. 1979 Reorg. Plan No. 3,
eff. Jan. 2, 1980, 44 Fed. Reg. 69-273, 93 Stat. 1831 and Exec. Order No. 12188, 45
Fed. Reg. 989, Jan. 4, 1980.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(2).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2413.
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2414.
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Under the new law the USTR must determine within 45 days whether to
initiate an investigation based on a petition 2 and, generally, must hold any
public hearing within 30 days of that determination." The time limits within
which the USTR must recommend to the President what action, if any, to
take range from 7 to 12 months after the date of the initiation of the
investigation." In the case of a petition alleging only an export subsidy the
time limit is 7 months. ' The President must determine, within 21 days after
receiving the recommendation of the USTR, what action he will take, if any.'
The President's action under section 301 can be identical to and timed to
correspond with the countermeasures proposed under the dispute resolution
procedure of the GATT or a code, thereby eliminating the unilateral nature
of the U.S. response to a foreign trade practice and the attendant criticisms.
Section 301 now provides for a domestic procedure which parallels the
international dispute resolution process. On the day the USTR decides to
initiate an investigation under section 301, the USTR must request
consultations with the foreign country or instrumentality concerned. If the
case involves a dispute under a code (or other trade agreement) and a
bilaterally acceptable resolution is not reached during the code's consultation
period, the USTR "shall promptly request proceedings on the matter under
the formal dispute settlement procedures provided under such agreement." 7
Each code negotiated during the Tokyo Round contains a dispute
resolution procedure.8 Although the procedures under each code differ in
technical details, 9 the basic framework under each includes consultations,
conciliation, review by a panel of experts, written reports from the panel to a
committee of the whole and, possibly, recommendations by that committee
within a specified period of time. These procedures are patterned after those
in the Draft Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance,' another agreement negotiated during the
Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(A).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(2).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2413.
48. See Subsidies Code, supra note 2, at Articles 12-13, 16-18.
49. See Standards Code, supra note 2, at Articles 14.9-14.11 (relating to the refer-
ral of questions of a technical nature to a group of technical experts). It is expected that
this special procedure will be used often for disputes involving agricultural issues, such
as veterinary standards.
50. Tokyo Round Texts, supra note 2, at 634-648.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE JOURNAL
A means of illustrating the announced commitment to the implementa-
tion of the codes would be for the USTR, acting through the trade policy
organization"1 and in consultation with the private sector,52 to establish
priority issues for resolution under the codes. Those issues, if not raised in a
petition by an interested person, can be raised by the President.53 For
agriculture, the primary issues for resolution would involve the use of section
301 to interpret and implement the codes on subsidies, product standards
and, possibly, licensing.
THE SUBSIDIES CODE
Of primary concern to U.S. exporters of agricultural products as a trade
problem for resolution under the codes is the clarification and enforcement of
the new discipline on the use of export subsidies. Article 101 of the Subsidies
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1872. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 established an interagency
procedure for establishing a unified government position on trade matters. The position
is established through the consultations of the Trade Policy Committee, which acts
through subcommittees unless there is a major interagency disagreement to be re-
solved at the Secretarial level. The Trade Policy Committee includes the highest level
representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agri-
culture, Labor, Transportation and Energy; the Office of Management and Budget, the
Council of Economic Advisors, the National Security Office and the International De-
velopment Cooperation Agency. The Chair and Vice-Chair are filled by the USTR and
the Secretary of Commerce, respectively. The Trade Negotiating Committee, a subcom-
mittee, is limited to the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor and to the USTR, which is the Chair. Exec. Order No. 12188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989,
Jan. 4, 1980.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (relating to general policy and technical advice from the pri-
vate sector on trade agreements and trade policy). The private sector, formed into com-
mittees, meets to discuss issues and provide advice to the President.
53. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1).
54. Art. 10 of the Subsidies Code reads in full:
"M(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI:3 of the GATIT, signatories
agree not to grant directly or indirectly any export subsidy on certain primary
products in a manner which results in the signatory granting such subsidy having
more than an equitable share of world export trade in such product, account being
taken of shares of the signatories in trade in the product concerned during a pre-
vious representative period, and any special factors which may have affected or
may be affecting trade in such product.
(2) For purposes of Article XVI:3 of the GATT and paragraph 1 above:
(a) 'more than an equitable share of world export trade' shall include any case in
which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory is to displace the
exports of another signatory bearing in mind the developments on world
markets;
(b) with regard to new markets traditional patterns of supply of the product con-
cerned to the world market, region or country in which the new market is
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Code contains the refinement of the GATT's rule concerning the use of export
subsidies on agricultural products. Article 10 :2(a) defines "more than an
equitable share of world export trade" to exist when the effect of an export
subsidy is "to displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind the
developments on world markets." With regard to new markets, traditional
patterns of supply to the world market, region, or country in which the new
market is situated shall be taken into account in determining what is an
equitable share of world export trade.' Perhaps most importantly, under
Article 10:3, "Signatories further agree not to grant export subsidies on
exports of [agricultural] products to a particular market in a manner which
results in prices materially below those of other suppliers to the same
market."
Several major issues remain unresolved by the language of Article 10.
The threshold issue is which governmentally bestowed benefits are subject to
the new discipline. Is a reduced interest rate production credit an export
subsidy? Are concessional credit terms export subsidies when the exports are
part of an aid transaction? Is a deficiency payment an export subsidy?
Equally important as an issue is how to determine when the effect of an ex-
port subsidy contravenes the discipline of a third country market. Is more
than an equitable share of a third country market to be measured by an
increase in the exporter's market share, in the absolute volume it exported,
in the historic rate of its increase in exports to the third country market, by
another measure or by one or more of the above?
A third issue will revolve around the development of the meaning of the
price discipline under Article 10:3, perhaps the most concrete development
under the Article.
THE STANDARDS CODE
The Standards Code is another code whose implementation through
section 301 would benefit U.S. exporters of agricultural products. A body of
international precedent would be helpful if it developed guidelines concern-
ing when a product standard is intended to be, or is per se, a barrier to
international trade.
situated shall be taken into account in determining 'equitable share of world
export trade';
(c) a previous representative period shall normally be the three most recent
calendar years in which normal market conditions existed.
(3) Signatories further agree not to grant export subsidies on exports of certain
primary products to a particular market in a manner which results in prices
materially below those of other suppliers to the same market."
55. Art. 10(2)(b).
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Under the Standards Code countries agree not to use technical regula-
tions and standards (including packaging, marking and labelling require-
ments and methods for certifying conformity with technical regulations and
standards) to create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.' However,
a country may enforce a nondiscriminatory measure which is necessary to
ensure the quality of its exports; to protect human, animal or plant life or
health or the environment; or to prevent deceptive practices, even if it
impedes market access."
Standards form one of the most often used barriers to international trade
in agricultural products. For example, countries have differing standards
concerning how a plant or animal must be grown, how an animal may be
slaughtered or further processed, which diseases and pests in a foreign
country threaten the health of citizens and when the quarantine of imports is
necessary. The Standards Code should result in the harmonization of some
and the removal of other trade standards when they impede trade.
There is some disagreement among certain signatories of the Standards
Code whether the code's provisions cover process and production methods as
nontariff barriers. The language of Article 14.25 is unclear: "The dispute
settlement procedures set out above can be invoked in cases where a Party
considers that obligations under this Agreement are being circumvented by
the drafting of requirements in terms of processes and production methods
rather than in terms of characteristics of products."
Whether standards drafted in terms of processes (the form in which
many agricultural standards are drafted) are covered by the code became a
major issue soon after the code became effective. Great Britain required that
imported poultry be treated according to a process called spin-chilling, a
process not prevalent in the United States. American exporters of poultry
products considered the UK's spin-chilling requirement an unnecessary
nontariff barrier. The requirement will become even more restrictive in 1982,
when it will be made applicable to imports into any EEC member state.
Consultations under the Standards Code led to no resolution of the issue.
The U.S. government probably will raise the question of the spin-chilling
requirement in an Article XXII proceeding so as not to cause a major dispute
56. Standards Code, supra note 2, Article 2.1.
57. Id., Article 2. This provision may be used as a loophole. It and many others in
the Standards Code refer either specifically or by implication to agricultural products.
See Articles 1.1 (relating to coverage), 2.4 (relating to performance standards), 12.4
(relating to special and differential treatment for developing countries), 13.3 (relating
to Codex Alimentarius), 14.6 (relating to disputes concerning perishable products), 14.7
(relating to disputes concerning crops with a 12 month crop cycle), 14.9 (relating to
technical issues), and 14.25 (relating to processes and production methods).
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under the Standards Code. The exporters of poultry products might, however,
file a petition under section 301, which will squarely focus attention on
spin-chilling as a process which is contrary to the Standards Code and thus
create a major dispute despite the caution adopted by the government in its
choice of proceeding.
THE LICENSING CODE
The elimination of discriminatory and arbitrary import licensing sys-
tems through the implementation of the Licensing Code" could be a third
category of priority. Procedurally a licensing system may lead to burdensome
administrative delays which can have a variety of adverse effects on imports
and on trade, e.g., unfavorable market price variation during the delay, loss
of goodwill and the cost of legal advice or litigation. With perishable
agricultural products, a last minute delay can result in the deterioration or
spoilage of the product and its consequent rejection by the importer. The
enforcement of the Licensing Code and the encouragement of broader
ratification would ease the administrative burdens faced by U.S. exporters of
agricultural products.
CONCLUSION
The Congress has repeatedly expressed through legislation its desire
that the President act, when appropriate, to protect the access of U.S. exports
of agricultural products to foreign markets. The Congressional concern with
the effects of nontariff barriers to trade on market access became more
accentuated as the variety and complexity of those barriers increased.
However, the President rarely used his statutory authority to retaliate
against practices deemed unfair. The use of that authority raised major issue
concerning the U.S. government's compliance with international rules
regarding acceptable procedures for dispute settlement and most-favored-
nation treatment. Thus, the use of the domestic legislation had significant,
adverse foreign policy implications. This situation has been changed by the
1979 amendment to section 301, which links the domestic procedure to an
international dispute settlement process and internationally authorized
retaliation. 9 Thus, two of the previous reasons for Presidents' hesitation to
58. See supra note 2. The Licensing Code applies to automatic and non-automatic
import licenses. The Code attempts to establish transparency, fairness and some cer-
tainty in the import licensing process.
59. See text at pp. 16-18 and accompanying footnotes, infra.
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use section 301, when valid assertions of denial of market access were raised,
no longer exist.'
Section 301 proceedings will result in bilateral consultations on impor-
tant market access issues and simultaneously can serve to establish a body of
precedent interpreting the new codes of conduct on nontariff barriers to
international trade. Naturally some restraint on the use of the section will
persist. It is still considered a less desirable tool than friendly consultations
and negotiations for the removal of nontariff trade barriers.
As in 1962 and 1974, present U.S. exporters of agricultural products
have reason to anticipate that their access to foreign markets and fair
conditions of competition will be enhanced through the implementation of a
new law. It remains to be seen whether they will be more satisfied with Title
IX of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 than with the previous statutes.
Clearly the delays in action which characterized the previous laws no
longer exist. Several bilateral consultations have occurred in relation to the
transition cases. 61 Moreover some major issues are now being considered in
proceedings under the auspices of the GATT.62 Those developments represent
significant accomplishments.
On the other hand, there is as yet no indication that the President will
use his authority to initiate section 301 proceedings sua sponte as a means of
implementing and developing precedent under the codes. Rather the
emphasis might be directed towards friendly negotiations and a more active
60. See the prior section 2411, Pub. L. 92-618, Title III, § 301, Jan. 3, 1975, 88
Stat. 2041 and the present section, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 for a comparison of Presidential
responses to foreign import restrictions and export subsidies.
61. The proceeding concerning barley malt was terminated because the EEC re-
duced the level of the subsidy and the Community's practice was addressed by the
Subsidies Code (45 Fed. Reg. 41558, June 19, 1980). The proceeding concerning wheat
was terminated on the basis of a US-EEC cooperative framework on problems in world
wheat trade (45 Fed. Reg. 49428, July 24, 1980). The proceeding concerning canned
fruits was terminated because the Community fixed the amount of the levy during the
Tokyo Round (45 Fed. Reg. 41254, June 18, 1980). The proceeding concerning egg albu-
men was terminated because the supplemental levies have not been applied since 1976
(45 Fed. Reg. 48758, July 21, 1980). Informal bilateral discussions have been held con-
cerning wheat flour and citrus fruits and products.
62. The USTR determined that the EEC's preferential duties on citrus fruits and
products affect bindings made by the Community. He also determined that the EEC's
subsidy on exports of wheat flour is inconsistent with the Community's obligations
under the Subsidies Code. Article XXII bilateral consultations were requested on both
issues. They will be followed by an Article XXIII proceeding, if necessary.
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role for the Secretariat of the GATT'. Eventually, however, the President
and others may find that carefully selected, self-initiated cases which lead to
the development of clear guidelines on the use of nontariff barriers to trade
in agricultural products would be of benefit to all exporters of agricultural
products.
63. An unclassified cable from the U.S. Mission in Geneva suggests: "post MTN
implementation will probably continue to dominate 1981, especially with the procure-
ment and valuation codes coming into force January 1. However, 1980 has already
shown areas where much more work must be done in the future if the GATT is to be
forward looking. The agricultural sector comes immediately to mind as the Cathedral
concept is fleshed out. Clarification if not renegotiation of critical parts of the Standard
[sic] Code appears called for in light of the spin-chill case. Further trade liberalization
must also be examined, especially in view of the global negotiations." Geneva 11953,
Sept. 8, 1980.
